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BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
EXPLANATORY NOTES 
All italics and emphasis are added unless otherwise stated. 
In 1942 and 1943, when the negotiations for the building 
of the new yard and the closing of Ninth South and Fifth 
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East Streets were conducted, Maurice Harding was Mayor 
and J. P. lVIcGuire and Joseph H. Swapp were the other two 
members of the Provo City Commission. In the fall of 1943 
there was a municipal election to fill the office of Mayor and 
the office of Commissioner held by J. P. McGuire. Mayor 
Harding was re-elected. J. P. McGuire failed of re-election 
and Blake D. Palfreyman was elected in his place. The Com-
mission :::s so constituted continued in office throughout the 
periods and events involved herein. R. K. Bradford, R. S. 
Lawrence and E. C. Jensen mentioned herein are respectively: 
Executive Assistant to the Trustees of the Railroad, Agent 
for the Railroad in Provo, and Attorney for the Railroad. 
JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURT 
Appellants make no contention that the United States 
courts are without jurisdiction in these cases. If the Court 
desires to be advised of the nature of its jurisdiction, it is 
set forth in Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Rule 52 of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District 
Courts of the United States provides as follows: 
Findings of Fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
The court in compliance with that Rule made separate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 18-26.) Appel-
lants' Statement of Facts ignores the Court's Findings. They 
are not described. They are referred to only once. (P. 4.) 
The following vital statements as to facts in appellants' 
brief are contrary to the Court's finding and to the un-
contradicted or overwhelming weight of the evidence: 
a. On pages 2, 8, 21 and 24, that there was no agreement 
between the City and Railroad, that their minds never met, 
that the matter never passed the negotiation stage. This is 
v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. CO. ET AL. 3 
disproved in Sections 2, 3 and 7 of appellees' Statement of 
Case. 
b. On page 24, that the Railroad did not act in reliance 
on the representations and promises of the Mayor and Com-
missioners. This is disproved in Section 4 of appellees' State-
ment of Case. 
c. On page 25, that the City Government and the public 
did not acquiec;;ce in the closing of the street. This is dis-
proved in Section 5 of appellees' Statement of Case. 
d. On page 25, that no irreparable damage would result 
to the Railroad from reopening the street. This is disproved 
in Section 6 of appellees' Statement of Case. 
e. On pages 24 and 25, that the Railroad has not ful-
filled conditions imposed by the City. This is disproved in 
Section 8 of appellees' Statement of Case. 
Appellants' Statement of Case fails to assist the Court 
by describing the evidence and referring to record where the 
testimony of the various witnesses may be found. For these 
reasons appellees are constrained to make their own state-
ment of the case. 
Reference to the record herein thus: (R. 20=56-65) 
means that the Court's Finding of Fact appears at R. 20 and 
evidence supporting it at R. 56-65. 
1. The Mayor and Commissioners induced the Railroad 
to build the new yards inside instead of outside Provo City 
limits in order to secure additional taxes and economic bene-
fits, knowing that the street crossings must be eliminated. 
In 1942 and 1943 freight traffic handled in the freight 
yards in Provo increased to such an extent that extensive 
additional railroad yards had to be constructed. (R. 20=56-
65.) Bradford explained to the Mayor and Commissioners 
in July, 1942 and February, 1943 (R. 20 = 66, 70, 140, 167) 
that the Railroad had a free choice of doing this in either of 
two ways: first, if Ninth South and Fifth East were closed, 
it could enlarge the existing yards within the corporate 
limits of Provo City; second, if they were not closed, it would 
build new yards south and outside of Provo City. (R. 20 = 
69, 140, 167.) Bradford took the entire commission out to the 
locations and showed them on the ground (R. 67, 68) how the 
workers could get to their work after the crossing closing. 
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(R. 68.) The Mayor and Commissioners, in order to in-
crease tax receipts and business and employment within Provo 
City, urged the Railroad to enlarge the yards within the limits 
of Provo City. (R. 20 = 70, 72, 140, 167, 260.) Bradford 
explained to the Mayor and Commissioners that it would be 
impossible to comply with their wish unless the crossings 
over the railroad tracks by Ninth South and Fifth East Streets 
be closed to all travel. (R. 20 = 66, 69, 75, 140, 166, 167, 
234, 407.) The Court's finding to this effect is based on the 
uncontradicted evidence. 
The anticipated benefits have been realized by the City. 
(R. 25 = 128, 260.) Assessments of railroad property were 
increased on account of the enlarged yards so that taxes were 
increased about $2,400 per year. (R. 25 = 127, 260.) Also 
the City has had the economic advantages of having the yards 
built inside the City. (R. 25 = 260.) 
2. Full rrgreement was reached at the Feb. 25, 1943, 
.meeting that the street c1·ossings would be eliminated and 
the yanls would be built inside the City. Actual commence-
ment of the wo1·k was postponed, becrruse of a protest by 
citizens, until April 7, 1.943. 
Appellants repeatedly state throughout their brief that 
no agreement was ever reached, that the minds of the parties 
never met and that the matter never passed the negotiation 
stage. The court found the contrary and the evidence abund-
antly supports the finding. 
At a meeting of the Provo City Commission held in its 
chambers on February 25, 1943, the Mayor, all Commissioners, 
the City Attorney, City Recorder, Bradford, Lawrence and 
Jensen were present. (R. 71-73, 138, 319.) Bradford told 
them the project would cost over $100,000.00 (R. 140) and 
showed them Exhibit 4, (not in the printed record but copies 
supplied) a map of the proposed enlargement of yards, show-
ing Ninth South as closed, Fifth East as closed and a cut-off 
between Fifth East and Ninth South. (R. 74.) According to 
the uncontradicted evidence Bradford told the Commission 
that, if the enlarged yards were to be in Provo, Ninth South 
would have to be closed. (R. 20 = 75, 140, 16,6, 167, 234, 407.) 
Thus fully informed, the Mayor and Commissioners promised 
that an ordinance closing the crossings would be passed. (R. 
v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. CO. ET AL. 5 
20 = 77, 78, 141, 168.) The court so found (R. 20). That find-
ing is supported by the evidence of Bradford (R. 77, 78), Jen-
sen (R. 141) and Lawrence (R. 168). The Mayor denied that 
the Commission promised the Railroad to pass an ordinance (R. 
237) but merely said that the Commission would consider pass-
ing it. (R. 236.) Commissioner Swapp both affirmed and 
denied that any commitment was made at the meeting. (R. 
377.) Commissioner McGuire, when asked the direct question 
whether any commitment was made, answered, "I don't recall 
that there was any definite statement to that effect." (R. 409.) 
The Mayor and Commissioners wanted to avoid the 
appearance of steam rollering the closing of the streets, (R. 
187) and it was agreed that the newspaper story, Exhibit 21 
(R. 531), would be given to the press. (R. 78, 187, 190, 191.) 
It was published on Feb. 25, 1943, in the Provo Herald, a 
newspaper of general circulation in Provo. It described the 
project, stated that it would necessitate the closing of Ninth 
South and described the cut-off road between Ninth South 
and Fifth East. It stated that the Commission was studying 
the matter, rather than that the matter was agreed upon, to 
avoid the appearance of arbitrariness. (R. 187, 190, 191, 202, 
203.) 
On Feb. 25, 1943, it was agreed that the Railroad attorney 
was to prepare the necessary ordinance for the closing of the 
street and send it to the City Attorney. (R. 75, 77, 78, 142, 
236, 377, 409.) Under date of March 9, 1943, the Railroad 
attorneys addressed a letter to the City Attorney (Exhibit 
28, R. 143, 144, 145) enclosing a form of ordinance (Exhibit 
29, R. 145, 146) with the statement that it was to be passed 
to cover the closing of the streets. The City Attorney ad-
mitted receiving that letter and form of ordinance (R. 144), 
and never expressed any surprise at or dissent from the state-
ments made in Exhibit 28. (R. 154.) 
In a protest dated February 27, 1943, a group of approxi-
mately two hundred citizens, led by Frank C. Cordner, pro-
tested the closing of Ninth South. (Exhibit 64, R. 91.) The 
Provo Herald of March 2, 1943, described it. (Exhibit 22, R. 
532.) The Railroad knew of it and kept in close touch with 
the Mayor (R. 83), repeatedly asking when the ordinance 
would be passed, (R. 83, 168). Time was precious and the 
Commission was urged to authorize the closing of the streets 
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so that the construction could be commenced at the earliest 
possible moment. (R. 21 = 168.) 
3. The Commission on April 7, 1.943, authorized the Rail-
road to go ahead with construction and promised that the 
ordinance ?.could be passed. 
On April 7, 1943, the Mayor told the Railroad Agent at 
Provo that the ordinance would be passed, the streets closed, 
and that the Railroad could go ahead immediately with the 
construction without waiting on legal formalities. The Court 
so found. (R. 21.) The evidence supporting this finding is 
overwhelming. R. S. Lawrence testified that Mayor Harding 
so stated. (R 169.) Mayor Harding himself on cross ex-
amination admitted that his understanding was that the Rail-
road was given verbal permission to close the street. (R. 
254-258.) A practising attorney at the Utah bar for twenty-
one years ( R. 253) , Harding never claimed that the closing of 
Ninth South was unauthorized. (R. 251-253.) On the contrary 
he wanted the Railroad to go ahead and close the street because 
he expected the Public Service Commission would force the 
Railro;:1,d to build a viaduct. (R. 258.) It was sort of an entrap-
ment. On January 10, 1945, he voted "No" to a resolution to 
require the reopening of Ninth South. (R. 254.) Commissioner 
Palfreym'm in that meeting read a prepared statement in 
which he asserted, "Mayor Harding states that the City Com-
mission gave the Railroad Company verbal permission to close 
the road" * * * . (R. 255.) Harding didn't deny that he 
made that statement. (R. 255.) He admitted that it was his 
understanding that oral permission had been given to the 
Railroad to close Ninth South (R. 255) and that Mr. Lawrence 
had been so informed pursuant to authority of the Commission. 
(R. 256, 257.) 
On April 9th the Provo Herald published an article that 
Ninth South was to be closed. (R. 90, 169, Exhibit 26, R. 533.) 
The inference is irresistible that the Mayor gave the story 
to the press. It was not given to the press by the Railroad. 
A reporter asked Lawrence for it and was referred to the 
Mayor. (R. 169.) The newspaper article states: "Closing 
of Ninth South Street-will be ordered by the City Commission 
in an ordinance to be adopted next week." It then directly 
quotes Mayor Maurice Harding as stating: ""With numerous 
tracks to be constructed across the street, a dangerous hazard 
v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. CO. ET AL. 7 
would result unless the road is closed, Mayor Maurice 1-Iarding 
stated." This newspaper clipping was in Mayor Harding's own 
scrap book. (R. 90, 268.) Mayor Harding was in court through-
out the trial and was a witness, but did not deny that he made 
the statements in the newspaper article. Exhibit 26 (R. 533). 
Moreover, Lyle E. Waid, a witness produced by Provo City, 
quoted Mayor Harding as saying to him in 1943 that Ninth 
South Street would never be reopened. (R. 366.) Mayor Hard-
i~g did not contradict this evidence. 
The actions and behavior of the Railroad men and the 
Mayor and Commissioners immediately after April 7, 1943 dem-
onstrate that all of them understood that the Railroad was 
authorized to go ahead in advance of the passage of the ordi-
nance. The Agent at Provo on April 7th telephoned to Salt Lake 
that the work could commence at once. (R. 83, 169.) On April 
7, 1943 the Railroad Superintendent wrote to the Division 
Engineer (Exhibit 25, R. 85) that work was to proceed. (R. 
86.) On April 7, 1943 Bradford addressed a letter to the Rail-
road attorneys, with copies to seven officials of the three rail-
roads involved, Union Pacific, Utah Railway and D. & R. G. Vv'., 
reciting the agreement with Provo City as to the closing of 
the streets and abandonment of the property occupied by the 
streets, with full information as to the reversion of the vacated 
property and with instructions to the attorneys as to what 
should be done to consummate the transaction agreed upon 
with Provo City. (Exhibit 24, R. 87-90.) 
4. The Railroad relied on the promises and representa-
tions of the Mayor and Commissioners by abandoning the 
alternative of building outside of Provo, by building the cut-
off road and by constructing the new yards at a cost of 
$160,000.00. 
Appellants repeatedly assert that equitable estoppel is in-
applicable because the Railroad did not act in reliance on the 
promises and representations of the .Mayor and Commissioners. 
In so contending they ignore the Court's findings to the con-
trary, (R. 21) and the undisputed evidence. 
The Railroad, relying on that promise, abandoned the 
alternative of building outside of Provo in the open country 
where there vwuld be no problem of city streets crossing the 
yards. 
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The Railroad, relying on the promise (R. 206) imme-
diately after April 7, 1943 secured easement for (R. 96) and 
constructed (R. 96) the cut off road, 41.25 feet wide by 625 feet 
long (R. 97), from Fifth East to Ninth South. The cutoff road 
was constructed by the Railroad, accepted as a public road, was 
scraped and graded by Provo (R. 416) and has been constantly 
used as such. (R. 261, 416.) It is shown on the Provo map as 
a public street. (R. 261.) 
The Railroad secured property rights necessary for the 
new yards and grading therefor was commenced north of the 
crossing on April 11, 1943 (R. 181) and continued until Sep-
tember, 1943. (R. 94, 95.) The Ninth South crossing was 
barricaded and closed to traffic in May, 1943. (R. 182.) Eight 
new tracks were laid across Ninth South in June and July, 1943 
(R. 183) at a cost to the Railroad of $160,000. (R. 21, 22 = 
94-101.) 
5. The City government and the public knew of and 
acquiesced in the closing of the streets. 
Appellants' brief, page 25, contends that neither the City 
government nor the public acquiesced in the closing of the 
street. The Court found (R. 22, 23) and the evidence conclusive-
ly shows that they did. 
Mayor Harding said that he expected the Railroad to go 
ahead as it did, build the yards and barricade Ninth South, 
and that is why he didn't protest or prevent when he saw the 
Railroad so doing. (R. 258, 259.) J.P. McGuire, Commissioner 
of Streets (R. 412), knew when the streets were barricaded in 
May, 1943 (R. 413), wasn't surprised (R. 413), and made no 
objection or protest (R. 416, 417). When the Railroad provided 
the cut-off road he accepted it and scraped and graded it. (R. 
416.) Commissioner Swapp knew that the streets were barri-
caded in May, 1943 (R. 383). The Mayor and Commissioners 
discussed the barricading of the streets (R. 383) and nothing 
was said to the effect that the Railroad was closing the streets 
without authority (R. 384). 
No one in the Provo City government made any protest or 
objection. (R. 171, 182.) The Mayor, Commissioners, City 
Attorney and City Engineer were in close touch with the con-
struction of the new yards. They knew of the closing and barri-
cading of Ninth South in May, 1943 (R. 251). They didn't com-
municate with the Railroad in any way about the closing and 
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barricading. (R. 251.) The Commission made no charge that 
the closing and barricading was unauthorized during 1943 
or 1944. (R. 252.) 
Ninth South and Fifth East have been barricaded and 
closed to travel ever since May, 1943. No effort has ever been 
made to open Fifth East Street (R. 168, 261). No effort was 
made by Provo City to open Ninth South until March, 1945. 
(R. 250, 251.) Prior to that time the City did not even ask 
the Railroad to open it. (R. 253.) 
All of the new yards were completed and in use on or about 
September 1, 1943 (R. 22=94, 95) and since that time down to 
the time of trial were in active and daily use (R. 22=101, 102) 
in the handling of freight traffic. 
Provo City in fact co-operated with the Railroad. It was 
building some new water pipe lines along Ninth South and in 
order to avoid expense made arrangements with the Railroad so 
that they would be finished before the tracks were laid. (R. 
182, 281.) Moreover, the City changed its plans because of the 
projected railroad yard enlargement and put in an additional 
six inch cast iron pipe line so that the City wouldn't later have 
to tunnel under the many tracks. ( R. 287.) This was recom-
mended by the City Engineer to the Mayor and Commissioners 
in April, 1943 for the stated reason that the pipe line should 
be put in ahead of the new tracks. (R. 287.) The Railroad 
left the new tracks open until after the City finished its trench. 
(R. 183.) At the request of the City the Railroad did some 
of the City's work and was reimbursed for it. (R. 183, 184, 282.) 
There was full co-operation between the City and the Railroad 
throughout the construction. (R. 23 = 281-299.) 
The fact of the closing of Ninth South and Fifth East 
Streets was conspicuously published in the Provo Press. (R. 
22-23 =Exhibit 26, R. 90, 533) and was well known to citizens 
and residents of Provo City and Utah County. (R. 23 = 319, 
342, 361, 366.) Approximately two hundred residents of Provo 
City and Utah County prior to March 4, 1943, and thereafter 
protested in writing to the Mayor and Commissioners about the 
closing of Ninth South Street, but took no other or effective 
measures to prevent the same. (R. 23 = 346.) All other citi-
zens and residents of Provo City and Utah County acquiesced 
in and made no objection to the closing of Ninth South Street. 
(R. 23.) No objection has ever been made to the closing of 
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Fifth East Street where it formerly approached to and joined 
with Ninth South Street, by Provo City, its Mayor, any of its 
Commissioners, or any of the citizens or residents of Provo 
City or Utah County. (R. 23 = 168.) 
6. The opening of a street across the yards would result 
in irreparable damage to the Railroad. 
Appellants' brief, page 25, says opening the street would 
not cause irreparable damage. The Court found and the evi-
dence conclusively shows it would. The opening of Ninth South 
Street across the railroad yards and tracks would make it neces-
sary for trains and cuts of cars being switched or stored to be 
divided at the crossing (R. 23 = 103); would make necessary 
much slower handling of trains and cars in the yards (R. 23 
= 189); would reduce the usefulness and efficiency of said 
yards to the extent of approximately fifty percent (R. 23 = 
104) ; would greatly increase the cost of operation of said rail-
road by said Trustees (R. 23 = 103); would constitute a ser-
ious danger and hazard to the public traveling across said rail-
road yards and tracks (R. 23 = 103-105, 187-190, 191-199); 
might make it impossible to handle the traffic (R. 24 = 104) ; 
would interfere with the efficient operation of the railroad and 
increase the costs of operation (R. 24 = 103-106) ; and might 
require abandonment of the new yards and relocation of the 
same outside Provo City at a cost of approximately $100,000.00. 
(R. 24 = 103-105, 187-190, 191-199.) 
Exhibit No. 7 (R. 511), No. 8 (R. 513), and No. 11 (R. 
519), are pictures of the area formerly crossed by Ninth South 
over the Railroad yards. Exhibits No.9 (R. 515), and No. 10 
(R. 517), show the barricade on the east side. Exhibits No. 
12 (R. 521), and No. 13 (R. 523), show the barricade on the 
west side, partially restored. 
Provo City has never made any offer to reimburse 
Trustees, or otherwise place them in statu qu.o, for losses and 
damages which will result to the property of the debtor if such 
crossing were to be reopened. (R 24.) 
7. No disagreement between the City and Railroad existed 
prior· to September, 1943, until after the yar·ds were built and 
just before a City election to elect a ma.yor aud commissioner. 
Appellants' brief, page 2, asserts that "a full blown con-
troversy developed, the Railroad and City officials charging 
v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. CO. ET AL. 11 
each other with being unfair." Ninth South was closed in 
May, 1943. (R. 182.) The yards were completed and in opera-
tion by September, 1943. (R. 94, 95.) There is no evidence of 
any disagreement about the matter until the meeting of the 
Commission in the latter part of September, 1943, when 
Bradford charged that the Commission had failed to keep its 
word about the ordinance, (R. 106, 547) and Mayor Harding 
charged that the Railroad hadn't fulfilled some of its promises. 
(R. 5'17.) Even then the City did not claim that the Railroad 
had acted without authority in closing Ninth South but only 
that it had not complied with certain requirements. (R. lOG, 
107, 241, 242.) 
Mayor Harding and Commissioner McGuire were up for 
election in November, 1943. George T. Harrison was candi-
date for Mayor and attacked Mayor Harding and the Com-
missioner for closing Ninth South. He wrote to the Public 
Service Commission on September 20, 1943, (R. 541) and 
October 4, 1943, (R. 542). Newspaper articles in the Salt 
Lake Tribune of October 3, 1943, (R. 543) and the Provo 
Herald of October 3, 1943, (R. 545) described this attack. 
From that time on the matter was involved in politics. The 
Mayor and City Commissioners did not keep their promise to 
pass the ordinance closing Ninth South and Fifth East Streets 
and finally in the early part of 1945, contrary to their repre-
sentations and promises, commenced threatening to open 
Ninth South Street across said yards and tracks (R. 23 = 
170, 171) ; and on March 9, 1945, removed the barricades on 
the east and west sides of the Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad yards and tracks and commenced the reconstruc-
tion of a roadway along Ninth South Street across said yards 
and tracks. (R. 23 = 170, 171, 245.) 
8. The Railroad has not failed to comply with any con-
dition imposed by the City to the closing of the streets. 
Appellants' brief, pages 24 and 25, assert that the City 
imposed five conditions before the street would be closed. 
The Court found that only two conditions were imposed (R. 
20, 21) and that the Railroad had not failed to fulfill them. 
(R. 24, 25.) The evidence overwhelmingly supports the court's 
finding. 
After the yards were built inside Provo at their request, 
Mayor and Commissioners attempted to excuse their failure 
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to pass the ordinance by wholly unsupported claims that the 
Railroad had not performed its promises. There is a lot of 
loose talk in the record by Mayor Harding and Commissioners 
Swapp and McGuire to the effect that their agreement to 
pass the ordinance was not kept because the Railroad didn't 
live up to its obligations in five particulars: first, that the 
Railroad would furnish some substitute crossing which could 
only be a viaduct; second, that the Railroad would eliminate 
the protests by the citizens who used the crossing; third, that 
the Railroad was to secure authority from the Public Service 
Commission to cross Ninth South; fourth, that the Railroad 
was to pay for the cost of rebuilding certain water and light 
lines paralleling the cutoff road; and fifth, that the blocking 
of traffic by trains at University Avenue would be eliminated. 
There is no substance in the evidence as to any of these 
excuses. As to the first one the court found and the evidence 
is, without any conflict, that the Railroad did not represent 
or promise Provo City that it would provide any crossing 
over, under or upon said railroad tracks but on the contrary 
has affirmatively and consistently informed Provo City, its 
Mayor and Commissioners that it would not do so. (R. 24 = 
92, 141, 286, 396, 410.) 
As to the second excuse, the court found that the Rfl.ilroad 
never represented to no;· promised Provo City that it would 
eliminate the protests or objections of any citizens or residents 
of Provo City and Utah County to the closing of said streets, 
but on the contrary affirmatively and consistently stated 
that it would not do so. (R. 24.) Mayor Harding testified 
both on direct (R. 234) and cross (R. 263) that Bradford 
stated at the February 25, 1943, meeting in the most specific 
and positive way that the Railroad could and would do nothing 
to eliminate the pro! ests. Bradford also so testified (R. 131). 
Commissioner M:cGuire said-"it was stated that the matter 
(i.e. the protests) perhaps could be taken care of" (R. 407). 
But he didn't testify as to who made such a statement or who 
would do the taking care of. Commissioner Swapp testified 
that the Railroad at the meeting of .July 14, 1942, "agreed to 
take care of any protests-" (R. 374). He said he was a 
little confused about later meetings (R. 375) but did describe 
his recollection of the meeting of February 25, 1943, (R. 376) 
and didn't mention any agreement as to taking care of protests. 
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In view of the vague and confm;ed nature of Swapp's evidence 
and the clear-cut statements by Bradford (R. 131) and Mayor 
Harding (R. 234, 263), the fact finder could hardly find 
that any such agreenent was made. 
As to the third excuse, the court found that the Public 
Service Commission of Utah informed the Railroad that it 
was not concerned with the closing of Ninth South Street 
and Fifth East Street or with the occupation by said railroad 
tracks of the space formerly occupied by said streets. (R. 
24.) This was according to the uncontradicted evidence of 
Bradford (R. 108) and .Jensen (R. 148). They quoted the 
Chairman of the Public Service Commission as so saying and 
of adding that they were not going to pull the chestnuts of the 
Provo City Commission out of the fire. 
As to the fourth excuse, the court found that Provo 
City has never moved the water and light lines referred to; 
has never billed Trustees for the cost thereof; and Trustees 
have repeatedly stated their willingness to 1x1y such costs 
and have requested bills therefor. (R. 24, 25.) This is sup-
ported by the uncontradicted evidence of Bradford (R. 107, 
Ex. 30 R. 111, Ex. 40 R. 122) and Mayor Harding (R. 314). 
As to the fifth excuse, the court found that at conferences 
prior to April 7, 1943, between the Mayor and Commissioners 
acting for Provo City and Bradford, Bradford stated that the 
proposed reconstruction of the yards and tracks, if within 
Provo City, would involve removal of the railroad wye from 
its then location near Sixth South Street and University 
Avenue to a position south and east thereof; that the Trustees 
intended to move the freight office, house and dock from their 
location east of University Avenue to a new location approxi-
mately two blocks west thereof; that the west lead to the new 
yards would be approximately 800 feet east of University 
A venue; and that all of these measures would tend to reduce 
the blocking of University A venue by the Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad operations (R. 25). The court 
further found that all of the measures so described by Brad-
ford have been fulfilled and tend to reduce the blocking of 
traffic at University Avenue by the Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad operations; and that University Avenue 
is also crossed by tracks of the Union Pacific Railroad 
immediately south of the tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande 
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Western Railroad (R. 25). The court noted a lack of evidence 
as to whether the street blocking was caused by the Denver 
and Rio Grande Western or Union Pacific (R. 25). The 
court's findings are supported by the evidence of Bradford 
(R. 482-490). It would have been silly for the Railroad to 
have agreed to eliminate the blocking of University A venue 
when part of it would be by Union Pacific and some blocking 
at a grade crossing is inevitable. (R. 482-490.) No witness 
testified that the Railroad made any such promise. Commis-
sioner Swapp came nearest to such evidence. He said the 
Railroad promised "to relieve the burden on University 
A venue." (R. 37 4.) He didn't testify that the Railroad 
promised to eliminate it. Commissioner McGuire testified 
that Bradford expressed the thought that the new yard would 
"minimize the congestion on University Avenue." (R. 407.) 
Mayor Harding quoted Bradford as stating that the new 
yards would move the switching farther south, which would 
"free University Avenue from congestion so that the only 
traffic on University A venue would be moving trains." Brad-
ford, of course, was talking about Denver and Rio Grande 
Western traffic, not Union Pacific, because he wouldn't know 
about that. 
BRIEF OF ARGUMENT 
I 
UNDER WELL SETTLED UTAH LAW THE DISTRICT 
COURT PROPERLY ADJUDGED PROVO CITY ESTOPPED 
FROM CLAIMING THAT THE CROSSING WAS NOT 
LEGALLY VACATED. 
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS POINTS A, B and G. 
The District Court and this Court should follow the law 
as announced by the Utah Courts. 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 
1188, 58 S. Ct. 817. 
This is true in equity cases also. 
Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 
82 L. Ed. 1290, 58 S. Ct. 860. 
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It is true also as to the bankruptcy court as to questions 
of the sort here involved. 
Prudence Realization Corporation v. Geist, 316 U. 
S. 89, 86 L. Ed. 1293, 62 S. Ct. 978. 
Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 
318 U.S. 434, 87 L. Ed. 884, 63 S. Ct. 679. 
It has been well settled law of Utah since 1917 that 
municipal corporations may be estopped with respect to 
public streets and property. 
Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pac. 766. 
Plaintiff contended that Eighth South Street between 
Tenth East and Thirteenth East was only 66 feet in width 
and that the City should be restrained from digging a sewer 
excavation outside of such 66 foot limit. The City contended 
that the street had been established 132 feet wide by original 
plats prior to 1871. Wall contended the City should be 
estopped because in 1891 the City approved a plat of Fremont 
Heights in which Eighth South Street was shown as only 
66 feet in width. The city attempted to contend that its action 
in authorizing the approval of the Fremont Heights Addition 
was ulm vires, illegal and void but was estopped so to do. 
The court stated the equities in the case as follows: in 
1891 the question arose as to the width of the street; the 
City Council went upon the premises, inspected them and 
authorized the City Engineer to approve the plat; there-
after \Vall's predecessor in interest deeded certain interests 
in lots for a nominal consideration; thereafter Wall loaned 
money on the security of a mortgage on the property in ques-
tion which was thereafter foreclosed and the property bought 
by Wall; thereafter Wall sold and conveyed parts of the land 
in question by warranty deeds; improvements were made on 
the land in question and taxes levied and paid thereon. 
On page 604 the court quoted with approval the follow-
ing statement of the law from 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporation 
(5th Ed.) Sec. 1194: 
It will perhaps be found that cases sometimes 
arise of such a character that justice requires that 
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an equitable estoppel shall be asserted even against 
the public, but if so, such cases will form a law unto 
themselves, and do not fall within the legal operation 
of limitation enactments. The author cannot assent 
to the doctrine that, as respects public rights, muni-
cipal corporations are impliedly within ordinary limita-
tion statutes. It is unsafe to recognize such a prin-
ciple. But there is no danger in recognizing the 
principle of an estoppel inpais as applicable to excep-
tional cases, since this leaves the courts to decide the 
question, not by mere lapse of time, but upon all the 
circumstances of the case to hold the public estopped 
or not, as right and justice may require." 
The Utah Court emphasized that the City had benefited 
from increased taxes and had made no offer to place Wall in 
statu quo, both of which facts occur in the case at bar. Said 
the court on p. 606: 
In additicn to this the defendant went on for years 
and years m~scssing this property against the plaintiff as 
private property. Its revenues were increased by hun-
dreds of dollars by the sums exacted from the plain-
tiff on the assumption of the defendant that the 
property assessed belonged to her. As far as the 
record disclosed not even the slightest pretense of an 
offer has ever been m«de to place her in statu quo. 
On page 607 the court said : 
We hold that this case falls within the exceptional 
class of cases referred to by Judge Dillon, and that it 
is the duty of the court to decide it as "right and 
justice require." It is our opinion that the city is 
estopped from claiming the premises in question as 
a public street. 
Note that taxes levied against the Railroad by Provo 
City have increased $2400.00 per year on account of increased 
assessments based on the enlarged yards. (R. 25 = 128.) Note 
also that Provo City has made no offer to place the Railroad 
in statu quo. (R. 24.) 
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Note that the Wall case holds that the estoppel is not mere-
ly against the entity of the municipal corporation or its of-
ficials but is against the public, which except for the estoppel 
would have the use of the public way. 
Most of the cases on this subject rely on the statement 
of the law made by Judge Dillon and quoted in the Wall 
case. Note that the acts of Wall and Wall's predecessors, in 
reliance upon the affirmative acts and representations of the 
City officials, were not nearly so weighty as in the case at bar. 
The Utah law that municipal corporations may be estopped 
with respect to public streets was reaffirmed in 1941. 
Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 Pac. 
(2d) 406. 
Appellants' brief on pages 4 and 8 reads as if the Elking-
ton case reversed the principle of the lVall case. On the con-
trary the principle of the Wall case was reaffirmed and 
applied by the court to the facts in the Elkington case and it 
was dec:ded that the necessary elements of estoppel were 
not· present. Indeed the Supreme Court itself, without sug-
gestion or citation of the \Vall case by counsel, raised the 
question as to whether Tooele was estopped under the doctrine 
of the Wall case. The question was whether a public street 
in a dedicated plat, which had never been used, could be 
deeded by Tooele City. It was held that it could not be. The 
history of Section 15-8-8 was described and attention was 
called to the fact that the statute was not complied with. The 
court, however, did not regard that as eliminating the doctrine 
of estoppel in pais but expressly recognized and applied the 
doctrine of the Wall case. If the court had regarded Section 
15-8-8 as eliminating the doctrine of estoppel, that would 
have been the short answer in the case. Instead of that the 
court considered the equities of the case and concluded that 
there was no ground for the application of the estoppel and 
the principle of the Wall case. On page 494 the court said: 
In the case at bar, the consideration given the 
city by Elkington was small, if anything; the deed 
was made in contravention of the statute; there is no 
evidence that the property has been assessed against 
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the defendants or their predecessor in interest; the 
time element is short; and there was not a replatting 
or a change in the whole neighborhood to the benefit 
of all adjacent landowners. 
Balancing the justices of the cause, we find there 
is no ground for an estoppel in pais as against the 
city. 
The Utah statute in force at the time of the acts relied 
on as constituting an estoppel in the Wall case did not have 
the words "by ordinance," which are now and at the time of 
the Elkington decision, were in the Utah statute, Section 
15-8-8, U. C. A. 1943. (Text is set forth in Appendix B.) The 
Elkington case approves the doctrine of estoppel enunciated 
in the Wall case at a time when Section 15-8-8 was identical 
with the present statute. Thus the Wall case and the Elking-
ton case together settle the Utah law to be that regardless 
of Section 15-8-8 a municipality and the public may be estopped 
under certain circumstances such as to make it more just that 
the public be deprived of a public way than that a private party 
be subjected to resulting hardship. 
Appellants make no reference to the recent case of Hall 
v. North Ogden City, 166 Pac. (2d) 221 (Utah report not yet 
printed) decided by the Supreme Court of Utah Feb. 16. 1946, 
doubtless because they correctly regard it as not in point. It 
neither adds to nor detracts from the principle of the Wall 
and Elkington cases. 
The Ogden case arose under the United States and Utah 
Township Acts. The Utah statute, Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1876, Sec. 1174 (set forth in Appendix B), used most emphatic 
prohibitory language against any impairment of the public 
title. The statute reads in part: 
(The title) * * * shall vest in and be held 
by the corporation absolutely, and shall not be claimed 
adversely by any person or persons whatsoever. 
The court sharply distinguishes between a case under the 
Township Act and one not under it. The Township Act is not 
applicable in the case at bar. Even in the presence of the em-
phatic prohibitory language of the Township Act, the court 
studiously avoided negativing the possibility of equitable estop-
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pel being applicable in a proper case although under that stat-
ute. The court placed great emphasis on the circumstance in the 
Ogden cac;e that the fee was owned by the city, not the abutter. 
In the case at bar the fee is owned by the Hailroad and, upon 
the closing of the street, that fee is free and clear of the ease-
ment. The court so found and concluded. (R. 25, 26.) Such 
was the uncontradicted evidence. (H. 157, 158.) Both the 
majority and minority opinions disclose the absence in that 
case of the elements essential in or(\er to apply equitable estop-
pel against a municipal corporation in regard to public streets, 
(affirmative misrepresentations, reliance thereon and great 
hardship) which elements were present in the Wall case and 
so abundantly involved in the case at bar. 
The weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports 
the rule of the Wall and Elkington cases. 
The text books cited by appellants so state and demonstrate 
by citations. 
On page 22 appellants cite Section 1189 of the Third 
Edition of Elliott on Roads and Streets and set forth the 
entire section except the last paragraph, which reads as 
follows: 
It may be, however, that where there has been an 
abandonment or there have been misleading acts or 
other peculiar circumstances, as in some of the cases 
cited in the first two notes to this section, and im-
provements have been made and rights acquired on the 
faith thereof, such a case may be made as will justify 
the application of the doctrine of estoppel. 
In the Fourth Edition of the same work the author states 
the doctrine much more strongly for the application of estoppel 
in the case at bar by adding to Sec. 1189 the following sen-
tence: 
Such appears to be the general rule sustained by 
the weight of authority when the making of valuable 
improvements in a highway has been induced by the 
act of the municipality. 
In footnote 9 on page 1696 Elliott cites cases supporting 
his statement from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michi-
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gan, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Wisconsin, Wyoming, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas 
and Utah. The Utah case is Wall v. Salt Lake City. 
On page 7 appellants cite McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, 2nd Edition, Sec. 1515. McQuillin states the rule as 
follows: 
In many jurisdictions, including some of those 
where the rule prevails that title to streets cannot be 
acquired by third persons by adverse possession, such 
rule is largely nullified by holding that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel may preclude the right of a muni-
cipality to remove an obstruction or assert title to the 
:::;treet. Citing cases from the Federal Courts, Iowa, 
California. Colol·ado, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, 
l\/fississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, 
South Carolina, Wisconsin, Missouri, ·washington, 
Georgia, Pennsylvania and Michigan. 
Inasmuch as the Wall and Elkington cases establish the 
law applicc:blc to the case ~\t bar, the great number of cases 
cited by ]iXcQuil1in :md Elliott will not be cited in this brief. 
Appellees will disctws only certain cases especially relied on 
in the Wall c<.~.se and which refute various contentions of 
appellants. 
The doctrine announced by Dillon has been approved by 
the Sclpreme Court of the United States. Essex v. New Eng-
land Telegraph Co., 2::l9 U.S. 313, GO L. Ed. 301, 36 S. Ct. 102. 
The Telegraph Company made written application for a right 
of way for tele~>,Taph poles <tnd lines. The record of the 
selectmen disclosed no official action but shortly thereafter the 
lines were constructed and maintained for many years. There-
after the Telegraph Company needed to make repairs and re-
placements and asked for an official license. This was re-
fused and a threat was made to prevent future operation of 
the lines. The court held that the town was estopped. On 
page 321 the court said: 
A municipal corporation, under exceptional circum-
stances, may be held to have waived its rights or to 
have estopped itself. Randolph County v. Post, 93 U. S. 
502, 513; Boone County v. Burlington etc. R. R., 139 
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U. S. 684, 693; City Railway V. Citizens' Railroad, 
166 U. S. 557, 566; Louisville v. Cumberland Telephone 
Co., 224 U. S. 649, 662; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 
5th Ed., Sees. 1194, 1227. 
City of St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Terminal R. Co., 268 
Mo. 47, 186 S. W. 1080. St. Joseph induced the railroad to 
build its terminal inside city limits. To this end it passed 
ordinances vacating some streets but not all that were to be 
covered by the terminal. The Railway built the terminal over 
certain streets which were not so vacated. Later a private 
individual bought property abutting on one of these streets 
and attempted to open the street. The city was held to be 
equitably estopped. 
On page 1082 the court said: 
If ever the doctrine of equitable estoppel should 
be applied in a case brought by a municipal corporation, 
the one at bar is a case for ~mch application. 
On page 1083 the court said : 
The public rights should not be allowed to destroy 
vast private rights under the peculiar facts we have 
here. There are many cases where public rights, 
through the doctrine of equitr,ble estoppel, have been 
forced to give way to the more equitable rights of 
private parties. 
The Wall case relied heaYily upon cases from California 
and Wisconsin. 
Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373, 35 Pac. 1002. Los 
Angeles brought an action to recover a tract of land at the 
intersection of Spring and Main Streets, which was covered 
by portion of a building known as "Temple Block," claiming 
that the land in question was part of a public street. Before 
the building was commenced a controversy arose as to whether 
part of it was on the public street. The City Attorney re-
viewed the matter and reported that Temple was justified 
in erecting the building on the ground in question. There-
upon the building was completed and nothing was done until 
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the commencement of the present action. On page 1004 the 
court said: 
If the city had expressly agreed by its officers, 
with defendants' grantors, even in parol, that a certain 
line should constitute the boundary line between the 
street and the grantor's property, and upon the faith 
of such agreement the grantors had erected a block 
of buildings flush with the line of the street, as agreed 
upon by all parties, it would be a hard law that would 
allow the city to repudiate that agreement, and destroy 
the grantor's property. No court should countenance 
such a thing, and an estoppel in pais will rise up in 
the pathway of a city, to bar it and its principal, the 
people, from the commission of such a grievous wrong; 
and, to give the acts of this city a very limited meaning, 
we think its conduct in the present case at least equival-
ent to an oral agreement as to the location of the true 
boundry line of the street. 
Note the court's reasoning as to an express agreement. 
There was such in the case at bar. 
It was held that Los Angeles was estopped. Note through-
out that the consideration was of the public rights and that 
the city did not act formally. 
The Wall case also relied on Reuter v. Lawe, 94 Wis. 300, 
68 N. W. 955. Lawe owned the fee to the premises in question. 
He filed a plat in which the lands in question were designated 
as "Public Square." Thereafter a second plat was filed 
designating the land in question as "Lawe's Park." Thereafter 
Lawe treated the land in question as owned by himself and 
paid taxes thereon. He conveyed the same to Reuter. There-
after the property was treated by the city as public property. 
Reuter sued Lawe for breach of warranty, contending that 
the property was public property. The court held that the 
public was estopped. On page 957 the court said: 
* * * But, notwithstanding what has preceded, 
it is not an open question in this court that the conduct 
of a municipal corporation may be such that a change 
of its position will cause such injustice to those who 
have relied upon such conduct as to warrant the court 
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in preventing such change by an application of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais. * * * 
That the equitable rule is applied as freely against 
the public as against private persons is not maintained, 
but that the courts may administer justice by its aid, 
even where that results in controlling the conduct of 
municipal corporations, when the facts are such, in the 
judgment of the court, as to demand it to prevent mani-
fest injustice and wrong to private persons, is firmly 
established. 
The TV all case also relied on Paine Lumber Co. v. City 
of Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 449, 61 N. W. 1108. Recorded plats estab-
lished Henry Street between High and Pearl Streets in Osh-
kosh as public streets. A petition to open Henry Street was 
refused by the city council. Thereafter plaintiff built lumber 
yards on the lots adjoining Henry Street and across Henry 
Street. The City threatened to open the street and plaintiff 
brought action to secure an injunction. It was held that the 
City was estopped. On page 1111 the court said: 
The city authorities have charge of and represent 
the rights of the public in and to the public streets, 
and it has been held, and we think with great reason, 
that under the circumstances such as are presented, 
the city and its officers will be held bound by an 
estoppel in pais, to prevent injustice, from insisting 
upon and exercising as against the present plaintiff 
the rights acquired by the recorded plats. 
Here also the public was estopped by the acts of the city 
officials. 
A leading case on this subject (see Kanall v. Wright, 137 
Wash. 661, 244 Pac. 245) relied on in the Wall case is 
Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396, 37 Atl. 176. A road called 
"Lanvale Road" ran between two lots owned by plaintiff and 
sold by plaintiff to defendant. It was never discontinued as 
a highway but its use as such had been discontinued and 
buildings had been constructed across it. The court held that 
the public was estopped and that therefore plaintiff's title 
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was marketable and plaintiff was entitled to specific per-
formance against defendant. On page 178 the court said : 
* * * If ever there was a case where the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel ought to prevail against the 
public, it certainly is the case at bar; and we accord-
ingly hold, not that the appellant has acquired by 
prescription a right to that part of Lanvale road be-
tween his two lots, but that having title thereto under 
his deeds, subject to an easement in the public, and the 
easement having been abandoned, so that the public 
are equitably estopped to reclaim it, his title to the 
parcels of the road claimed by him is merchantable. 
Note that this plaintiff owned title subject to easement 
in the public, the same situation which exists with respect to 
Ninth South Street in Provo. (R. 25, 26 ~ 157, 158.) 
Peo]Jle v. W?:cuolrlt, 233 III. 572, 84 N. E. 64G. 
A plat on page 648 shows the geographical situation. 
Wieboldt had units of his depaTtment store on both sides of 
an alley. The City permitted him to vacate the alley between 
the two buildings if he would construct two alleys at right 
angles to the vacated alley so that persons could go back and 
forth with only the inconvenience of going around one section 
of the building. Wieboldt complied with this. Two years and 
nine months later, Friend, who was thereby inconvenienced, 
commenced this action and claimed that the City's action 
was void because it was wholly for the benefit of a private 
individual. The court held that the City was estopped. On page 
650 the court said: 
* * * If, however, we were in doubt as to the 
power of the city eouncil to vacate the portion of said 
alley vacated, we think the city council by the passage 
of said ordinance and the granting of the permit to 
vVieboldt to erect thereon a building connecting the 
two buildings formerly owned by him, and by said 
action inducing Wieboldt to dedicate to the city a por-
tion of lots 5 and 10 and to otherwise comply with the 
terms of said ordinance, has estopped itself to now 
evict Wieboldt from the possession of the portion of 
said alley vacated by the city council and now in the 
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occupancy of Wieboldt by his building * * * and, 
if the city is estopped, such estoppel is binding upon 
the relators. 
Here also the public was estopped by acts of the city 
officials. 
People v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488; 74 N. E. 437. 
The City granted to the railroad the right to build its railroad 
depot across a public street. After the depot had been erected 
and used for some years the people attempted to claim ,that 
this was unlawful. The court held that the City was estopped 
and that the estoppel applied against the public. On page 440 
the court said: 
It has frep;uently been decided that the doctrine 
of estoppel in pais is applicable to municipal corpora-
tions, but that they will be estopped, or not, as justice 
and right may require. There may be cases where, 
under all the circumstances, to assert a public right 
would be to encourage and promote a fraud. ·where a 
party aeting in good faith under affirmative acts of 
a city has made such expensive and permanent improve-
ments that it \vou~d be highly inequitable and unjust 
to destroy the rights acquired, the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel will be app]ied. 
Portland v. Inrnnn Poulsen Lumber Co., 66 Ore. 86; 133 
Pac. 829. The lumber company built a lumber mill costing 
$800,000.00 on two lots and over and across what the City 
claimed was a public road between the two lots. Before the 
building, the City stated that the question of whether a road 
existed was in doubt and then stood by while the building was 
constructed. The court held that the City was estopped. The 
court said: 
* * * There is not one rule of morals for a 
municipality and another for an individual. Should 
a private citizen request and induce another to enter 
upon his premises under assurance that he would 
never be disturbed, and stand by, and without protest 
see him spend three quarters of a million dollars in 
improvements relying in good faith upon the request 
made and the representation put forth, he would be 
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spurned from the court room if he attempted to regain 
possession of the property. 
Boise City v. Wilkinson, 16 Idaho 150, 102 Pac. 148 
Boise City was held equitably estopped in a case where a priv-
ate citizen had used part of a public street for many years. On 
this subject the court on petition for rehe:::ring said: 
The people in their collective and sovereign capac-
ity ought to observe the same rules and standard of 
honesty and fair dealing that is expected of a private 
citizen. In their collective and governmental capacity 
they should no more be alowed to lull the citizen to 
repose and confidence in what would otherwise be a 
false and erroneous position than should the private 
citizen. 
RohTbaugh, MayoT v. Moklr:T, 26 Wyo. 514, 188 Pac. 448. 
The municipal authorities of Casper, desiring a plot of ground 
for a public library, induced Mokler to exchange the desired 
plot for a triangular piece nearby which was part of a platted 
public street. Mokler occupied the same and improved it from 
that time on. Thereafter the City attempted to oust him. 
No formal action had been taken by the City in regard to the 
transaction. The court held that the town was equitably 
estopped. On page 450 the court said : 
It is well settled that, if the meaning of a contract 
or instrument is doubtful on its face, the practical con-
struction put upon it by the parties should have great 
weight in determining its proper construction. * * * 
* * * Having vacated that part of the street, 
and having given Mokler possession, and permitted 
him to remain in possession and to place improvements 
thereon, and having taken possession of the triangle 
B, and devoted it to public purposes, so that it cannot 
restore Mokler to his former situation, we think the 
city is estopped from now repudiating the transaction. 
The reasoning in regard to practical construction is note-
worthy because in the case at bar the parties placed a practical 
construction on the transaction by their acts and conduct. 
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The promissoru nature of the r-epresentations by the City 
Officials do not detr-act from the application of equitable 
estoppel. 
Appellants do not r:clise the question, but the Court may 
inquire as to whether estoppel may be based upon representa-
tions of a promissory nature. It is well settled that it may 
be. The authorities are set forth in Appendix C. 
Appellant.<> lJC!se theh· a1·gument under- Points A, Band G 
upon asertcd facts which iqnore the Court's findings and the 
evidence supporting those findings. 
On page 21 appellants say: 
There is no evidence in all the r·ecord of any posi-
tive promise, representation or action on the part of 
the Provo City officials authorizing the plaintiffs to 
close Ninth South Street. The record reflects nothing 
more than negotiations, discussions, correspondence 
and controversy between plaintiffs and defendants with 
respect to the closing of Ninth South Street. (Em-
phasis supplied by Appellants.) 
This ignores the finding of the Court that the Mayor and 
Commissioners promised and represented that the crossing 
wou!d be closed; (R. 20) that an ordinance would be passed 
closing the street over the tracks; (R. 21) that all legal require-
ments for the elimination of the crossing would be taken in 
due course; and that the Trustees need not wait but might 
proceed immediately to construct the new yards and barricade 
the street. (R. 21.) The evidence supporting these findings 
is fully described in appellees' statement of the case Sections 
2, 3 and 7. 
On page 23 appellants say: 
The Mayor had many telephone conversations with 
Mr. Lawrence, but does not think he told him the ordi-
nance would be passed in the conversation on April 
9, 1943,-
This suggests that appellants claim the inference that the 
Railroad was not informed that it was authorized to go ahead 
and that the ordinance would be passed. If so, it ignores the 
finding of the Court described in the foregoing paragraph. 
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(R. 21.) The evidence supporting that finding is described 
in appellees' statement of facts Section 2. 
On page 24 appellants say: 
* * * The city officials studied the problem, 
were favorably impressed, wanted the new yards in 
the city if possible, but stated the conditions of closing 
Ninth South Street to be: (a) The railroad had to 
eliminate the objections on the part of citizens and 
workers to the closing thereof; (b) the railroad had 
to provide access for workers going to and from work; 
(c) the railroad was to pay the cost of water and power 
line changeover; (d) the railroad to provide a cutoff 
to replace Fifth East Street at the point of intersection 
with Ninth South Street. (See exhibits 23, Trans. p. 
82; 25, 37, Trans. p. 118); and, {e) the railroad was to 
get permission from the Public Utilities Commission 
to close the street. (See Exhibit 67, Trans. p. 547.) 
These statements ignore the Court's finding that the only 
conditions imposed were: First, to furnish the cutoff road 
between Ninth South and Fifth East; and second, to pay for 
the moving of certain water and light lines. (R. 20, 21.) The 
evidence supporting the Court's findings is fully described in 
appellees' statement of the case, Section 8. 
On page 24 appellants say: 
The railroad has failed to eliminate the objections 
and to provide access for the workers to and from work. 
This statement ignores the Court's finding in paragraph six 
of the Findings of Fact (R. 24, 25) to the effect that the 
Railroad complied with all of its promises, except to pay for 
the moving of water and light lines, as to which bills had 
never been submitted although the Railroad had repeatedly 
requested submission of bills and expressed willingness to 
pay them. The evidence supporting this finding is described 
in appellees' statement of the case, Section 8. 
On page 24 appellants say: 
There was no reasonable reliance by the railroad. 
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This ignores the Court's finding that the Railroad in good 
faith relied upon the promises and representations and pro-
ceeded in reliance thereupon to build the new yards and 
barricade the streets and secure the cut-off road. (R. 21.) 
The evidence supporting the finding is described in appellees' 
statement of the case, Section 4. 
On page 24 appellants state that Mr. Bradford knew an 
ordinance was necess2,ry. Certainly this is true. That is the 
reason he exacted definite promise and representations that 
it would be passed. 
On page 24 appellants state that Mr. Bradford knew that 
permission from the Public Service Commission was necessary. 
That is not true and in fact such permission is not necessary, 
as is shown herein. 
On page 24 appellants state that the plain fact of the 
matter is that the Railroad decided to take a chance and make 
the improvement without an ordinance. The only chance 
taken by the Railroad was that the Mayor and Commissioners 
would fail to keep their solemn promise. 
On page 24 appellants state that the Railroad actually 
commenced work on the new yard before the alleged promises 
were supposed to have been made. The evidence of Division 
Engineer Zanolis is uncontradicted that the only work done 
by the Railroad prior to April 7th was done at a distance from 
the Ninth South crossing at a place where the work would be 
efficacious whether the yards were built inside Provo or out-
side Provo. (R. 181.) 
On page 25 appellants state that the City officials did 
not acquiesce in the closing of Ninth South Street. This 
ignores the finding of the court to the contrary. (R. 22, 23.) 
The evidence supporting the Court's finding is set forth in 
full in appellees' statement of the case, Section 5. 
On page 25 appellants state that there was no acquiescence 
on the part of the public and that the public did not stand 
by and permit the street to be closed without protest. The 
Court found that the citizens and residents did acquiesce. 
(R. 23.) The evidence supporting this finding is set forth in 
appellees' statement of the case, Section 5. 
On page 25 appellants state that there is no evidence 
that the Railroad would be irreparably damaged if the street 
were re-opened. The Court found the contrary in paragraph 
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5 of its Findings of Fact. (R. 23, 24.) The evidence support-
ing the Court's finding is set forth in appellees' statement of 
the case, Section 6. 
None of the cases cited by appellants undeT points A, B 
and G impair the authoTity of tlw lV all and Elkington cases. 
City of Roswell v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel Co. from 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cited on pages 21 and 
22 of appellants' brief is not inconsistent with the decree 
and judgment below. The Roswell case recognizes the applica-
bility of equitable estoppel to municipal corporations in con-
nection with streets and considered its application to that 
case but concluded and stated in the excerpt quot,ed by appel-
lants on pages 21 and 22 that the expenditures made by the 
telephone company were not in reliance on any representations 
or promises by the city. The contrary, of course, is true in the 
case at bar as shown under Section 4 of appellants' state-
ment of the case. The reasoning of the Roswell case is such 
as to indicate that if such a case as the one at bar were pre-
sented, the court would have applied equitable estoppel. 
Grand Trunk lV estern Railway Co. v. South Bend, from 
the Supreme Court of the United States, cited on page 8, 
holds that an ordinance by South Bend repealing a prior 
ordinance giving the Railway the right to add a second track 
along a public street violated the Constitution of the United 
States by impairing the obligation of a contract. There is no 
discussion of estoppel. 
Murmy v. Pocatello. from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, relied on by appellants on page 8, does not 
discuss estoppel but merely holds that under the Idaho Con-
stitution, Pocatello had no power to pass an ordinance which 
would make impossible the exercise of the police power to 
fix the rates of public utilities. 
Home Telephone and Telrgraph Co. v. Los Angeles, from 
the Supreme Court of the United States cited by appellants on 
page 9, contains no discussion of estoppel. It merely holds 
that a California statute empowering Los Angeles "to regulate" 
the telephone business did not authorize Los Angeles to pass 
an ordinance relinquishing entirely the police power of the 
State to regulate the rates of the Telephone Company. 
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The other cases cited on page 9 are similar to the three 
cases from the Supreme Court of the United States. With 
the exception of the cases hereinafter specifically described, 
none of them discuss the principles of estoppel or abandon-
ment involved in the case at bar. 
Appellants feature the case of Keyser v. City of Boise 
from the Supreme Court of Idaho on page 9 of their brief. 
There is no mention of estoppel in the case. It is merely 
authority that the city council of Boise did not have authority 
under the Idaho statute to grant an irrevocable license to 
install a gasoline tank in a city street. It is supported by 
much authority, as is shown on page 10 by the citation of 
3 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, Section 1319, and a 
large number of cases. The doctrine of the Idaho case, Mc-
Quillin and the other cases is wholly inapplicable to the case 
at bar. The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that a municipal 
corporation may be estopped. Boise v. Wilkinson, 16 Idaho 
150, 102 Pac. 148. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Augusta v. Burum, 
cited on page 9, applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
against Augusta revoking a revocable license to maintain an 
awning over part of a public street. The court said (26 L. R. 
A. page 344) : 
* * * We think that where citizens of Augusta, 
with the permission of the city authorities, erected 
awnings, which, of course, involved expense, there 
would be an equitable stoppel against a needless or 
capricious revocation of the permission until after 
the lapse of sufficient time to allow the parties in-
curring the expense to realize, in the use and enjoy-
ment of their awnings, a fair return for their outlay. 
Hibbard v. Chicago, cited by appellants on page 9, holds 
that a license to erect a glass and metal awning is revocable 
and that the city could not be estopped because it had no 
power, regardless of procedure followed. However, as shown 
above, Illinois is firmly committed to the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel against municipal corporations. 
In Bangor Twp. v. Bay City Traction & Electric Co., 
cited by appellants on page 9, the Court, while not denying 
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that a municipality can be equitably estopped, held that the 
street railway company, which had built on a public street 
without any authority or promises, was not entitled to the 
protection of the doctrine. 
,Jn Moore v. New York, cited on page 9, the Court of 
Appeals of New York held that New York City would be 
estopped to contend that in granting a contract it had ir-
regularly pursued authority with which it was invested. 
Most of the cases cited under Points A, B and G a1·e dis-
tinguished because under Utah law Provo City had the power 
to eliminate the crossing by ordinance or by conduct such as 
to estop it from cla.iming that the crossing was not eliminated. 
On page 6, appellants state that under the Utah statutes 
and decisions a city may vacate a public street "only by 
ordinance." Reference is then made to Section 15-8-8 U. C. A. 
1943. (Set forth in Appendix B.) It will be observed that the 
statute in question does not say "only by ordinance." It merely 
grants the power to vacate by ordinance. 
The statement that a public street can be vacated only 
by ordinance is refuted by the decisions and reasoning in the 
cases of TVall v. Salt Lake City and Tooele City v. Hllcington, 
both of yvhich are fully discussed sup1·ct. 
On pages 7-11 appellants cite McQuillin, Municipal Corp-
orations, Second Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 1515, and many cases 
in support of the contention that no estoppel could ~1rise be-
cause the City would thereby violate the general law or its 
charter. A reading of the text and the cases will disclose that 
they refer to cases where the municipal body has no power 
to do or is prohibited from doing the act in question. Therein 
is the distinction. The Provo City Commission had the power 
to eliminate the crossing by virtue of Section 15-8-8. (Set 
forth in Appendix B.) It merely failed to follow the prescribed 
procedure by passing an ordinance. The distinction between a 
complete lack of power and an irregular exercise of the power 
is well recognized in the authorities. 
On pages 11-13 appellants cite cases in support of the 
contention that if municipal corporations have no power to 
grant franchises to public utilities they cannot be estopped to 
deny that franchises had been granted. It seems unnecessary 
to discuss these cases because the grant of a franchise is not 
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involved in the case at bar and the City Commission had 
statutory power to vacate the street. The right of the Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad to operate a railroad sys-
tem within the city limits of Provo City is not denied nor in-
volved. The sole question is whether Provo City is estopped to 
deny that part of a public street extending over the railroad 
tracks has been vacated. That Provo City has the power to 
vacate the portion of the public street cannot be questioned or 
doubted. The power to vacate is expressly granted by statute. 
The only question raised is that such power was not pursued 
with technical exactness. The Supreme Court of Utah in the 
Wall and Elkington cases has held that the City should be 
estopped to assert that it did not pursue its authority with 
technical exactness. 
On pages 14 to 18 appellants contend that the City is 
wholly without power to eliminate the crossing except by 
ordinance because Section 15-8-8, U. C. A. 1943, (set forth 
in Appendix B) permits it to do so by ordinance. But this 
ignores the TV nll and Elkington cases, which establish the 
Utah law to be that a city may be estopped even as to the 
vacation of public streets. Because the Utah law is thus 
established, it seems unnecessary further to discuss the many 
cases cited on pages 8 to 18 of Appellants' brief. Many of the 
cases thus cited are from jurisdictions where the principle 
that municipal corporations may be estopped as to public 
streets is fully established: e.g. California, Idaho, Iowa, 
Illinois. 
II 
THE ELIMINATION OF THE CROSSING MADE IT 
UNNECESSARY TO SECURE FROM THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH ANY ORDER PER-
MITTING THE RAILROAD TO CROSS NINTH SOUTH 
STREET. 
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINTS C AND D. 
Appellants inaccurately state on page 19 that Sec. 76-4-15, 
U. C. A. 1943, (set forth in Appendix B) gives the Public 
Service Commission exclusive power to abolish any crossing. 
A reading of the statute will disclose that it only gives the 
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Public Service Commission exclusive power to determine and 
prescribe the manner, including the point of crossing and terms 
of installation, of a railroad over a public street. The statute 
is thus construed in Um'on Pacific R. Co., et al. v. Public 
Service Corwmission, 103 Utah 186, 134 Pac. (2d) 469, which 
holds that the power granted to cities by Section 15-8-8, U. 
C. A. 1943, (set forth in Appendix B) prior to the Public 
Utilities law was not repealed by implication thereby. See 
page 195. 
Analysis reveals that the decision of the question raised 
by appellants under Points C and D will follow the decision 
of whether the City was properly estopped to claim that the 
crossing was not vacated, abandoned or closed. 
If the City had kept its promise to pass an ordinance 
eliminating the Ninth South crossing, the fee to that property, 
owned by the Trustees of The Denver and Rio Grande West-
ern Railroad Company (R. 25, 26 = 158), would have been 
freed from the public easement. There would have been no 
public street to be crossed by the new railroad tracks and the 
Public Service Commission of Utah would have no jurisdic-
tion whatever over the construction of said new tracks on 
property owned by the Trustees. If the City is estopped to 
claim that the crossing is not closed, vacated or abandoned, 
as required by law, as concluded by the court (R. 27), the 
case is precisely the same as that assumed above. Physically 
there is no public street across that space. Exhibits 7, 8 and 
10 (R. 511, 513, 517) are pictures of the space formerly occu-
pied by Ninth South. Exhibit 12 (R. 521) shows the barricade 
on the west side of the tracks. Exhibit 9 (R. 515) shows the 
barricade on the easterly side of said tracks. De facto closing 
and vacation of Ninth South Street occurred in May, 1943, and 
has since existed. 
Provo City now attempts to claim that the crossing was 
not vacted because no ordinance was passed. The District 
Court held that the City was estopped to make such a conten-
tion. If the District Court were correct, the situation so far 
as Provo City is concerned is precisely as if the ordinance had 
been passed as promised. This is exactly the effect given the 
estoppel in Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396, 37 At!. 176, and in 
Gra,nd Trunk Western R. Co. v. City of Flint, 55 Fed. (2d) 384. 
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These perhaps are the reasons that induced the Public 
Service Commission to take the view expressed to Bradford and 
Jensen that they did not regard the controversy between the 
Railroad and the City as a matter in which the Public Service 
Commission had any interest and that it did not propose to 
pull chestnuts out of the fire for Provo City. (R. 108.) 
III 
THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO APPELLANTS' 
CONTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE UTAH REF-
ERENDUM STATUTE. 
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINT E 
Appellants assume that the Utah referendum statute 
(Section 25-10-21 Utah Code Annotated 1943, set forth in 
Appendix B) would be applicable to an ordinance vacating 
or an order abandoning the crossing. It is not at all clear 
that this assumption is correct. The Supreme Court dis-
cussed the applicability of the referendum statute in Keigley, 
et al. v. Bench, 97 Utah 69; 89 Pac. (2d) 480 and stated the 
test of applicability to be whether the ordinance in question 
is legislative or administrative in character. On page 78 
the court stated the determinative test as follows: 
It is apparent that here, where we are examining 
the original ordinance in juxtaposition to that enacted 
on August 5, 1938, to determine whether the changes 
made are legislative or administrative, the determin-
ative test is the first. Does the later ordinance make 
a new law or execute one already in existence? 
It is submitted that neither an ordinance vacating a 
crossing pursuant to Sec. 15-8-8, U. C. A. 1943, (set forth in 
Appendix B) nor an order abandoning the crossing pursuant 
to Sec. 36-1-3, U. C. A. 1943, (set forth in Appendix B) is 
legislative in character but is executive or administrative. 
Otherwise each of the multitudinous acts of the City having 
to do with the establishment or vacation or abandonment of 
streets or parts thereof would be subject to referendum. Ut-
most confusion would result and it would become impossible 
for the municipality to perform its functions. 
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But assuming that such an ordinance would be subject 
to the referendum statute, it must be clear that a municipality 
cannot avoid the estoppel resulting from the acts and conduct 
of its Commission by pointing to the referendum statute 
and contending that they are thereby deprived of their right 
to resort to the referendum statute. The City's contention in 
this particular would eliminate the settled law of Utah, an-
nounced by the Wall and Elkington cases, that municipalities 
may be equitably estopped under certain circumstances. 
Appellants' brief would make it appear that the citizens 
of Provo are anxious to avoid the closing of Ninth South 
Street but are frustrated in that desire by the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. This is based upon a petition in March 
1943, signed by some 200 citizens protesting the closing of 
the crossing. Appellants' assume that no more diligence is 
required by citizens to protect their rights than merely to file 
a petition with the City Commission even though thereafter 
they slumber soundly on their rights. There was a public 
announcement that the protesl was disregarded by the City. 
The Mayor of Provo told the press on April 7, 1943, that 
the street would be closed and the enlargement of the yards 
would proceed. (Exhibit 26 IL 533.) During the two or three 
months thereafter the streets actually were closed and the 
yards constructed. If the citizens of Provo were so vitally 
interested in the matter, then was the time for them to move 
effectively by injunction, by "initiating" an ordinance to pre-
vent the street closing under the referendum statute or other 
appropriate procedure. Instead, lhey were content to protest 
and remain silent when their protest was ignored. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that this is not 
sufficient diligence. J,ewis v. Pingree Nat. Bank, 47 Utah 35, 
151 Pac. 558. The Bank entrance encroached on a public street 
so that it partially obscured the show windows on either side 
thereof. The owners on either side protested but did nothing 
more during the construction of the building. The court held 
that it was not enough to protest but that affirmative steps 
should have been taken to prevent the purpresture. The 
court on page 48 said : 
So here. If the plaintiff desired to prevent the 
erection of the bank front as planned, and as all others 
who were interested with him understood it was plan-
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ned, and as he must have known it was planned and 
was being constructed, why did he not bring an action, 
as was done in the Tyson Case, which he now cites 
and relies on? Had he done that, the courts would 
undoubtedly have prevented the defendant from pro-
ceeding to erect the front as proposed by it. * * * 
Under those circumstances we think the plaintiff should 
be limited to his legal remedy, namely, the recovery of 
such an amount of damages as the usable value of his 
building may be depreciated by reason of the construc-
tion of the bank front as it now is. 
IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE PETITION TO INTERVENE. 
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINT F. 
The motion to intervene (R. 17) merely alleges that 
Thomas F. Pierpont, L. E. 'Vaid and G. T. Harrison were 
citizens of Provo and that the Railroad's petition affected 
their rights and that they had a defense to the Railroad's 
claims. There is no allegation that Provo City and its Nic:yor 
and Commissioners were not adequately representing the 
interests of the public; nor of fraud or bad faith or bad judg-
ment on the part of the City, its Mayor and Commissioners in 
the handling of the common interests; nor of any conspiracy 
between the City, its Mayor and Commissioners with the 
Railroad. 
Rule 24, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
of the United States, provides for intervention as of right 
and permissive intervention. Under neither clas~~ification is 
intervention allowed merely because the intervener so desires. 
If Pierpont, Waid and Harrison had a right to intervene, 
then, so far as the petition to intervene discloses, every other 
citizen of Provo had the same right, whether they viewed the 
matter in the same way as Pierpont, Waid and Harrison or 
differently. The result would be chaos. It is well settled that 
the citizens of a municipality do not have the right to inter-
vene and participate in a litigation to which the municipality 
is a party in the absence of a showing of fraud, bad faith, 
bad judgment or conspiracy. 
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O'Connell v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 19 Fed. (2d) 
460 (9th C. C. A.). The Pacific Gas & Electric Co. brought an 
action against San Francisco in a rate controversy. O'Connell 
sought to intervene. The trial court refused the intervention. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals held it was not an abuse of 
discretion. On page 461 the court said: 
If the appellant is entitled to intervene and be 
heard upon the question of the relative advantage of 
continuing the litigation to a final determination, rather 
than accepting the proposed compromise, the question 
is one upon which more than 100,000 consumers of 
gas are likewise entitled to be heard, none of whom 
has accepted the appellant's championship or indicated 
a purpose to join in intervention. * * * 
* * * Here neither fraud, bad faith, bad 
judgment, nor conspiracy is shown on the part of the 
municipal authorities, who represent all of the gas 
consumers. 
The foregoing case relied on Re Engelhard, 231 U. S. 
646, 58 L. Ed. 416, 34 S. Ct. 258. 
That there was no difference between Pierpont, Waid 
and Harrison on the one hand and the City of Provo on the 
other as to how this litigation should be conducted, is con-
clusively demonstrated by the fact that George S. Ballif, 
counsel of record for Pierpont, Waid and Harrison, is also 
counsel of record for Provo City, its Mayor and Commissioners, 
and actively participated in the formation of the pleadings, 
the trial of the case, the taking of the appeal, the preparation 
of the record and the appellants' brief. He appeared as at-
torney for Pierpont, Waid and Harrison in the Motions to 
Intervene filed April 20, 1945, (R. 17, 47) ; as attorney for 
Provo City, its Mayor and Commissioners on March 31, 1945; 
at the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss (R. 12, 47) ; as attorney 
for Provo City, its Mayor and Commissioners on May 14, 
1945, when the two cases were consolidated for pre-trial and 
trial (R. 17) ; as attorney for Provo City, its Mayor and 
Commissioners on May 14th at the pre-trial (R. 18). He 
actively participated in the trial of the case, examining and 
cross-examining witnesses. He produced and examined as 
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witnesses Mr. Thomas F. Pierpont (R. 368), Mr. Lyle E. 
Waid, (R. 355) and Mr. G. T. Harrison (R. 315). After the 
taking of the evidence and at the time set for argument Mr. 
I. E. Brockbank, City Attorney for Provo City, became sick 
and Mr. Ballif alone made the argument for Provo City, its 
Mayor and Commissioners. The Notice of Appeal, the stipula-
tion designating the record on appeal and appellants' brief all 
bear the name of Mr. Ballif. 
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that 
there was any difference of opinion between Mr. Ballif and 
Mr. Brockbank as to the conduct of this litigation. It is evident 
from the record that they were cooperating harmoniously 
throughout. The record affirmatively shows that there was 
neither merit nor substance to the petition to intervene. 
v 
A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE CANNOT ll'i1PAIR OR 
RESTRICT THE .JURISDICTION OF A FEDERAL EQUITY 
COURT. 
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINTS H AND I. 
Appellants contend that this Federal Equity Court is with-
out power to enjoin Provo City because the officers of Provo 
City were required by a municipal ordinance to remove ob-
structions to the street. This contention is contrary to the 
well established principle that the jurisdiction of Federal 
Equity Courts cannot be impaired or restricted by State laws. 
This has been twice decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in cases arising from Utah. 
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. 
v. L1:nck, 56 Fed. (2d) 957. 
National City Bank of New York v. Continental 
National Bank & Trust Co. of S. L. C., 83 Fed. (2d) 134. 
In the Linck case the contention was made that the Utah 
Public Utilities law prohibited the Federal Court from issuing 
an injunction. This court said, page 960: 
* * * The state cannot, even if it so desired, 
deprive the federal courts of their equity jurisdiction 
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to grant injunctions in proper cases. Pacific Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196, 
44 S. Ct. 553, 68 L. Ed. 975. 
If the State legislature cannot do so, certainly the Provo City 
Commissioners cannot. 
Reference to 35 C. J. S., Title Federal Courts, Section 7, 
page 784, and to Federal Digest, Subject Courts, Key Number 
259, will disclose literally thousands of cases to this effect. 
In the bankruptcy case the power to enjoin is specifically 
granted in Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U. S. C. 11, 
subsection 15. 
VI 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS Aim AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
HEREIN OF APPELLANTS' POINT J. 
Point J is stated on page 6 and at the bottom of p<l.ge 27 
of appellants' brief. On pages 28 to 30 appellants set forth 
nine paragraphs of the Court's Findings and assert that they 
are contrary to the evidence. On page 30 it is asserted that 
the Federal Court should have made Findings of Fact con-
trary to the findings in those nlne paragraphs and that certain 
additional Findings of Fact should have been made. 
Appellants content themselves with a mere ipse dixit. 
No reference to the record is made in support of the conten-
tions. The Court is left to search through a 550 page printed 
record to find why the Findings of Fact as made are contrary 
to the evidence and to ascertain what evidence supports the 
'findings that appellants contend should have been made. 
Appellants have wholly failed to satisfy Rule 52 of Rules 
of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United 
States providing that 'findings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. 
The words of Circuit Judge Huxman in Aluminum, Inc. 
v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 151 Fed. (2d) 652 
seem appropriate. (p. 653.) 
* * * In other words, they dumped the entire 
record in our laps and asked us to do their work for 
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them by requiring us to go through this labyrinth and 
abstract and search out what is necessary for a con-
sideration of the questions presented, and separate it 
from the chaff. 
Appellees statement of the case shows the evidence sup-
porting the Findings to be overwhelming. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment and decree 
of the District Court should be affirmed. 
P. T. FARNSWORTH, JR. 
W. Q. VANCOTT, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
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APPENDIX A 
Jurisdiction of the United States Court 
Jurisdiction in No. 3239, the civil suit, is based upon 28 
U. S. C. Section 41, because the corporate plaintiff is a citizen 
of Delaware, plaintiffs Wilson McCarthy and Henry Swan 
are citizens of Colorado, Provo City is a Utah municipal corp-
oration and the Mayor and Commissioners are citizens of 
Utah. The amount involved is in excess of $3,000.00, exclusive 
of interest and costs. It is well settled that a municipal corp-
oration of a State is a citizen of that State for purposes of 
jurisdiction. 
Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118. 
Seattle v. 0. & W. R. Co., 255 U. S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 200, 41 
S. Ct. 237. 
Cahill v. Hovcnden, 132 Fed. (2d) 422, lOth C. C. A. 
Jurisdiction in No. 3240 was exercised pursuant to a 
petition by the Trustee in bankruptcy authorized by an order 
of the District Judge of the United States District Court for 
the District of Colorado. In the Matter of The Denver and 
Rio Grande V!estern Railroad Company, Debtor, in Proceed-
ings for the Reorganization of thni Railroad. Exhibit 1 is 
a copy of such order. (R. 504.) 
As to whether jurif\diction should be exercised in the 
plenary civil suit or in the ancillary bankruptcy proceeding is 
not entirely clear and for that reason both of said proceedings 
were instituted and maintained. Authorities bearing on the 
question are : 
Shortridge v. Utah Sa,vings & Trust Co., 40 Fed. 
(2d) 328, lOth C. C. A. 
Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 104 Fed. (2d) 1 
8th C. C. A.; certiorari denied 308 U. S. 559, 84 L. Ed. 
470, 60 S. Ct. 100. 
Keaton v. Looney, 111 Fed. (2d) 34, lOth C. C. A. 
In re Missouri Pac. R. Co., 24 Fed. Supp. 724, 
District Court of Missouri. 
Schaffer v. Hughes, 139 Fed. (2d) 438, 8th C. 
C. A. 
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Continental Illinm:s Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of 
Chicago v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 
79 L. Ed. 1110, 55 S. Ct. 595. On page 676 the court 
said: 
It may be that in an ordinary bankruptcy proceed-
ing the issue of an injunction in the circumstances here 
presented would not be sustained. As to that it is not 
necessary to express an opinion. But a proceeding 
under section 77 (11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 205) is not an 
ordinary proceeding in bankruptcy. It is a special pro-
ceeding which seeks only to bring about a reorganiza-
tion if a satisfactory plan to that end can be devised. 
And to prevent the attainment of that object is to de-
feat the very end the accomplishment of which was the 
sole aim of the section, and thereby to render its 
provisions futile. 
The bankruptcy court, in granting the injunction, 
was well within its power, either as a virtual court of 
equity, or under the broad provisions of section 2 (15) 
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. C. A. Sec. 11 (15) or of 
section 262 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 
377). 
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the last case cited suggests that the jurisdiction of the 
United States court in a railroad reorganization case, under 
Section 77, may be broader than in ordinary bankruptcy cases. 
APPENDIX B 
Text of Various Utah Strttutes 
Section 15-8-8 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads as follows: 
They (the Board of Commissioners) may lay out, 
establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, 
pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, 
boulevards, sidewalks, parks, airports and public 
grounds, and may vacate the same or parts thereof, 
by ordinance. 
Section 25-10-21 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads as 
follows: 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, legal 
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voters of any city or town, in such numbers as herein 
required, may initiate any desired legislation and cause 
the same to be submitted to the law-making body, or to 
a vote of the people of such city or town for approval 
or rejection, or may require any law or ordinance 
passed by the law-making body of such city or town 
to be submitted to the voters thereof before such law 
or ordinance shall take effect. 
Section 76-4-15 Utah Code Annotated 1943 reads as 
follows: 
( 1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed 
across a public road, highway or street at grade, nor 
shall the track of any railroad corporation be con-
structed across the track of any other railroad or 
street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the 
track of a street railroad corporation be constructed 
across the track of a railroad corporation :1t grade, 
without the permission of the commission having first 
been secured; provided, that this subsection shall not 
apply to the replacement of lawfully existing tracks. 
The commission shall have the right to refuse its per-
mission or to grant it upon such terms and conditions 
as it may prescribe. 
(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive 
power to determine and prescribe the manner, includ-
ing the particular point of crossing, and the terms of 
installation, operation, maintenance, use and protec-
tion of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad 
or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a railroad 
and of each crossing of a public road or highway by 
a railroad or street railroad, and of a street by a rail-
road or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such 
crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain 
types of traffic in the interest of public safety and is 
vested with power and it shall be its duty to designate 
the railroad crossings to be traversed by school busses 
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and 
to require, where in its judgment it would be prac-
ticable, a separation of grades at any such crossing 
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heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe 
the terms upon which such separation shall be made and 
the proportions in which the expense of the alteration 
or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such 
grades shall be divided between the railroad or street 
railroad corporations affected, or between such corp-
orations and the state, county, municipality or other 
public authority in interest. 
(3) Whenever the commission shall find that pub-
lic convenience and necessity demand the establishment, 
creation or construction of a crossing of a street or 
highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of 
any public utility, the commission may by order, de-
cision, rule or decree require the establishment, con-
struction or creation of such crossing, and such cross-
ing shall thereupon become a public highvvay and 
crossing. 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, Sec. 1174 reads as follows: 
That whenever the title to such lands shall be held 
by the corporate authorities of any town or city, all 
lands designated for public use by such corporate 
authorities as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks, 
commons and public grounds, shall vest in and be held 
by the corporation absolutely, and shall not be claimed 
adversely by any person or persons whatsoever; and 
the judge of probate who shall have entered any lands 
in trust for any town or city which may afterwards be-
come incorporated, shall, under the same conditions, 
convey by deed to the corporation thereof the lands 
designated for the use of the public as aforesaid; that 
in the case of death or disability of the judge of probate 
or mayor who may have entered the lands in trust for 
any town or city under the law of Congress, as afore-
said, before the complete execution of such trust, the 
same shall vest in his successor in office, who shall 
proceed with the execution of the same in the same 
manner, and under the same conditions imposed by this 




Discussion of Promissory Estoppel 
It is well settled that equitable estoppel may be based 
upon representations of a promissory nature. 
31 C. J. S. Sec. 80 reads as follows: 
The doctrine of estoppel by representation is ordi-
narily applicable only to representations as to facts 
either past or present, and not to representations or 
promises concerning the future which, if binding at all, 
must be binding as contracts. 
Notwithstanding the unanimity of the courts with 
respect to the preceding statement as the statement of 
a general rule, representations as to the future or 
promises have been enforced or permitted to operate as 
a basis of an equitable estoppel if to do otherwise would 
help perpetrate a fraud or cause injustice in a case 
where the representation or promise has been made 
to induce action or is reasonably calculated to induce 
action and has in fact induced action on the part of 
the party setting up the estoppel. This exception has 
come to be known as the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. 
Accord: 
Jones Store Co. v. Dean, 56 Fed. (2d) 110 (8th 
C. C. A.) 
Colbath v. H. B. Stebbins Lumber Co. 127 Me. 406, 
144 Atl. 1. 
Raldne Realty Corp'n v. Brooks, 281 Mass. 233, 
183 N. E. 419. 
Thom v. Thom, 208 Minn. 461, 294 N. W. 461. 
Hanna State & Savings Bank v. Matson, 53 Wyo. 1, 
77 Pac. (2d) 621. 
American Law Inst:itute, Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, Section 90, reads as follows: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and 
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substantial character on the part of the promisee and 
which does induce such action or forebearance is bind-
ing if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. 
1 Wnliston, Contr. Rev. Ed. Sec. 139, page 502, reads as 
follows: 
There would seem, however, compelling reasons of 
justice for enforcing promises, where injustice cannot 
be otherwise avoided, when they have led the promisee 
to incur any substantial detriment on the faith of them, 
not only when the promisor intended, but also when 
he should reasonably have expected, such detriment 
would be incurred, though he did not request it as an 
exchange for his promise. 
There is an excellent annotation on the subject in 115 
A. L. R. 152. 
